Juan Antonio Matiz Monroy — Lawyer, Universidad de los Andes · Specialist in Criminal Law, Universidad Sergio Arboleda · Professional licence 294.746 (C.S.J.)
A divorce is almost always seen as a purely family matter: a judge who decrees the separation and divides what the couple built. It is worth saying at the outset and clearly, because it avoids unnecessary alarm: in most cases that is exactly what it is. Many divorces, even openly contentious ones, involve no criminal conduct and are resolved entirely in the family courts. Not every disagreement over property is a criminal matter, and not every arguable assertion is a falsehood.
There is, however, a less visible zone in which sometimes the marital conflict crosses into criminal law: the zone of property. When one spouse hides assets, manufactures documents, simulates debts or instrumentalises complaints, the family case stops being one and becomes two interlocking proceedings. Hence the idea running through this piece: most contentious divorces contain no offence, but when false documents, hidden assets or instrumental complaints appear, the line between civil and criminal stops being theoretical; and in both directions —for the person suffering the manoeuvre and for the one tempted to use it— the decision to cross that line calls for legal judgement rather than impulse. Where the same estate is fought over after a death, the logic is different and we deal with it in high-value estates.
That is the blind spot. Someone fighting over the division of the marital estate in the belief that a family lawyer is enough may discover, too late, that the other side moved its pieces on a different board —the criminal one— where they were not playing. This article describes, rigorously and without alarmism, the conduct that can hide behind a divorce contested over property and, in the opposite direction, the conduct that can rebound on whoever employs it; and why, when it appears, handling it benefits from the view of several experts: coordinated representation, family and criminal.
1. Criminal offences in divorce proceedings in Colombia: when a divorce stops being only a family matter
Divorce and the division of the marital estate are heard in the family courts. The offences that can appear inside them —falsehoods, procedural fraud, concealment of assets, false accusations— are investigated and tried in the criminal courts. These are different jurisdictions, procedures, timetables and, above all, different standards of proof: in family proceedings the judge weighs the evidence under the rules of reasoned assessment (Código General del Proceso, art. 176); in criminal matters, conviction requires knowledge beyond all doubt (Ley 906 de 2004, art. 381).
One and the same fact —hiding a property, inventing a debt— can live in both worlds at once: in the division, as an argument about the marital estate; and in criminal law, as a possible offence. Ignoring either plane has a cost. Someone who litigates only in family law loses the evidentiary leverage and the route to redress that criminal law offers; someone who thinks only of reporting may get the legal characterisation wrong or, worse, commit an offence themselves.
That is why the first task is not to accuse, but to delimit. What this article describes are situations that can amount to offences depending on the circumstances, never a general rule about divorces. The line lies in deliberate deception, forgery or concealment, and distinguishing legitimate conflict from criminal conduct is precisely the work of technical representation: before crossing the line that separates civil from criminal —in either direction— legal judgement is needed, not impulse.
2. Concealment and diversion of assets
It is the commonest manoeuvre and the one that diverts most property: making assets forming part of the marital estate disappear on paper, so that they do not enter the division. It can take many forms —simulated transfers to relatives or nominees, “sales” with no real price, interposed companies, invented debts that inflate the liabilities—, and several of them are criminally relevant.
Fraudulent removal of assets (article 253 of the Criminal Code) punishes with imprisonment anyone who “makes off with their assets or conceals them or commits any other fraud to the detriment of their creditor”. Its application to a spouse depends on the other holding a position comparable to that of creditor —their right to the marital share— and on the timing and form of the disposal. Where a court order already exists —precautionary measures over marital property, a decision on the estate or on maintenance— and the person under the obligation evades it by disposing of or concealing assets, the conduct fits better, or concurrently, in fraud against a judicial decision (article 454).
It is worth pausing on the instrument that makes almost all these manoeuvres possible, because simulating a contract —an apparent transaction concealing the real one— is in itself a civil concept and not an offence, and changes nature only according to the use made of it: if the simulated contract is documented with false data and produced as evidence, it may amount to falsehood; if it is put to the judge to mislead them, procedural fraud; and if it serves to remove assets to the detriment of the other spouse, fraudulent removal of assets. The same manoeuvre travels from civil to criminal by way of its instrumentalisation.
It is also worth naming a dimension that often goes unnoticed. Law 1257 of 2008 defines patrimonial harm as the “loss, transformation, removal, destruction, retention or diversion” of goods, values or resources intended to meet a woman’s needs (article 3, lit. d). It does not by itself create a free-standing offence, but it provides a framework of authority supporting protective measures and the account of the facts where concealment of assets is, in reality, a form of economic violence.
The practical consequence is that none of these labels is chosen in advance. A striking transfer may be a legitimate transaction badly explained or the first link in deliberate concealment, and only analysis of the dates, of the real price and of the existence of prior judicial decisions shows which of the two grounds one is on.
A recent change alters the calculation. Ley 2477 de 2025 added article 78A to the Criminal Procedure Code, which allows the criminal action to be extinguished through full redress of the harm in offences against property, a category that includes fraudulent removal of assets, with the exception of theft aggravated by violence and of extortion. It does not cover documentary falsehoods or procedural fraud, which protect public faith and the administration of justice. The practical consequence is that one and the same manoeuvre may be closed by redress in its property component and continue to be investigated in the rest.
3. Documentary falsehoods
The marital estate is proved with paper, and that is where it is falsified. The Criminal Code protects public faith with a scale of offences that often appear in high-conflict divorces, each answering to different conduct.
Obtaining a false public document (article 288) punishes anyone who induces a notary or official to record a false statement: the case of the untruthful sworn declaration about the property or cohabitation situation. Material falsehood in a public document (article 287) punishes the alteration of deeds, land registry folios or records. Falsehood in a private document (article 289) covers simulated contracts, “promissory notes” manufactured to inflate the marital liabilities and financial statements or certificates doctored to depress the value of a company or an asset. And use of a false public document (article 291) makes liable anyone who produces it in the proceeding even if they did not forge it; in the case of a private document, use already forms part of the offence in article 289.
From that follows something worth bearing in mind: a false document is rarely an isolated fact. Producing it in the divorce or division file usually generates a concurrence —the corresponding falsehood and, in addition, procedural fraud—, because that document is the “fraudulent means” by which the judge is misled. Detecting it in time can disable the manoeuvre and reveals the true dimension of what is at stake; and it warns, in the other direction, anyone considering manufacturing a document to improve their position: the exposure they take on is greater than they imagine.
4. Procedural fraud: misleading the judge
Procedural fraud (article 453 of the Criminal Code) is perhaps the offence that best describes what happens when a divorce goes bad. It punishes, with six to twelve years’ imprisonment, anyone who “by any fraudulent means misleads a public servant in order to obtain a judgment, decision or administrative act contrary to law”. The family judge is that public servant; the fraudulent means is the false document, the doctored inventory, the concealment of income or the coached witnesses.
Two features make it especially relevant. First: it protects the proper administration of justice, so it concurs with the falsehoods that serve as its vehicle, without absorbing them. Second: the case law requires the fraudulent means to have real capacity to mislead —a crude, easily rebutted assertion may not amount to it—, which makes technical analysis of each item decisive.
That is why procedural fraud marks clearly where the line between civil and criminal stops being theoretical: it is not crossed by someone who argues hard about the inventory, but by someone who deceives the judge in order to obtain a decision they would not otherwise obtain.
5. Instrumentalised complaints and perjury
There is one last, delicate zone in which criminal law appears twice over: as a weapon and as a risk. In high-conflict divorces it is not unusual for a criminal complaint to be used as a pressure tactic —falsely accusing the other spouse of an offence to gain an advantage in the division, in protective measures or in custody—. The law answers in both directions.
False accusation against an identified person (article 436) punishes, with sixty-four to one hundred and forty-four months’ imprisonment, anyone who under oath accuses another of conduct they did not commit. Perjury (article 442) punishes with six to twelve years anyone who, under oath, departs from the truth at a hearing —about assets, contributions, dates or cohabitation—. The victim of a fabricated complaint therefore has a criminal route of their own; and anyone thinking of using a false complaint as leverage should know that they are exposing themselves to a conviction.
It is worth saying plainly, because it is the most important warning in this article: instrumentalising criminal law in a divorce is a temptation that usually rebounds on whoever uses it. A groundless complaint can not only be dismissed; it can turn the complainant into a defendant for false accusation, and move to the criminal front a conflict that until then was being argued in the family courts. Serious representation does not manufacture other people’s offences or invent its own: it identifies them where they exist and proves them rigorously.
That distinction —between the offence that exists and the one that is imagined— is the first technical task of the case, and it holds equally for the person suffering the manoeuvre and for the one tempted to employ it: crossing into criminal law calls for legal judgement rather than impulse.
6. When these offences appear: the view of several experts
We insist on the nuance, because it matters: this does not happen in every divorce. But when it does —when there are signs of concealment, falsehoods or fabricated complaints— the case stops being one proceeding: to the family front is added a criminal one that runs in parallel and feeds off it. The evidence gathered on one front —statements, deeds, accounting expert reports, testimony— is usually decisive on the other. And a criminal decision declaring a document false or assets concealed can bear on the division: reopening inventories, triggering compensating entries in favour of the marital estate, or serving as the basis for reviewing a family judgment obtained by fraud.
In those cases, attending to a single front is risky. A family lawyer without a criminal perspective may miss that certain acts by the other side are offences, losing evidentiary leverage and the route to redress. A criminal lawyer without command of the matrimonial property regime may get the characterisation wrong —forcing a fraudulent removal where the claim does not yet exist, or ignoring the marital character of an asset—. And an uncoordinated strategy runs a further risk: that what is asserted in the family case contradicts what is stated in the criminal one, and that the contradiction itself becomes evidence of procedural fraud or perjury.
The criminal route also brings something the division alone does not offer, because in the criminal proceeding the person affected acts as a victim with a right to full redress and, once responsibility is established, can bring the full-redress proceeding (articles 102 to 108 of Ley 906 de 2004) to claim compensation for the financial and non-financial loss caused by the offence, a route of economic recovery additional and complementary to that of the marital estate. The application does, however, lapse thirty (30) days after the conviction becomes final, so the moment it is triggered matters as much as the decision to trigger it.
That is why, when the case calls for it, the joint view of a family expert and a criminal one stops being a luxury and becomes a necessity.
7. From the consultation to representation: a dual strategy
Where a divorce conceals manoeuvres over property, the key is not choosing between the civil and the criminal front, but articulating them from day one. This is how the work is ordered in practice.
Stage 1 — Property and evidentiary diagnosis. The initial consultation reconstructs the marital estate, identifies the signs of concealment or falsehood and defines what evidence must be secured before it is altered or disappears.
Stage 2 — Coordinated strategy on both fronts. The plan for the family proceeding is drawn up and, in parallel, the existence of offences is assessed, taking care that the assertions and evidence on both fronts are consistent with each other.
Stage 3 — Action and evidence. Steps are driven in the family case and, where appropriate, the criminal complaint is filed with technical support; the evidence obtained on one front is deployed on the other.
Stage 4 — Division and redress. The criminal results are brought into the division —reconstruction of the estate, compensating entries— and, where it lies, redress is pursued through the criminal proceeding.
That order answers a simple reason. Manoeuvres over property are prepared before the divorce breaks out and executed during the proceeding, so a view integrating civil and criminal from the outset allows them to be anticipated, documented and answered on both fronts at once; and it also allows the opposite, which is just as valuable: ruling out in time that there is an offence where there is only a disagreement over property, and so avoiding a case made worse by a decision taken on impulse.
8. Conclusions
Most divorces, even contentious ones, are resolved in the family courts alone. The line into criminal law appears where there is deliberate deception, forgery or concealment. Hiding marital assets or simulating their sale may be fraudulent removal of assets or, where a court order exists, fraud against a judicial decision. A false document produced in the file usually adds the falsehood to procedural fraud. Procedural fraud requires a means genuinely capable of misleading the judge.
Criminal law also works in the opposite direction. A groundless complaint used as leverage can turn the complainant into a defendant for false accusation. Departing from the truth under oath can amount to perjury. When this conduct appears, the divorce becomes two interlocking proceedings with different standards of proof. Evidence on one front weighs on the other. The full-redress proceeding, for its part, lapses thirty days after the conviction becomes final.
Distinguishing the offence that exists from the one that is only imagined is the purpose of the initial consultation. In it we review the marital estate, identify signs of concealment or falsehood and define what evidence to secure. From that diagnosis, the firm can take on victim representation or criminal defence, consistently with the family front.
Frequently asked questions
What people usually ask us
Is hiding assets in a divorce an offence?
It can be. Making assets of the marital estate disappear, transferring them or simulating their sale, to the detriment of the other spouse, can amount to fraudulent removal of assets —sixteen to fifty-four months— (article 253 of the Criminal Code) or, where a court order is involved, fraud against a judicial decision (article 454). The exact characterisation depends on the circumstances, on the timing of the disposal and on the existence of prior judicial decisions, so it must be analysed case by case.
What if my spouse produced false documents before the family judge?
Producing false documents in a proceeding can amount to several offences at once: the corresponding falsehood (articles 286 to 291 of the Criminal Code, according to whether the document is public or private and whether it was altered or used) and, in addition, procedural fraud (article 453), because the document serves to mislead the judge. These are distinct offences that usually concur, which increases the criminal exposure of whoever produced them.
Is simulating a contract to hide assets an offence?
Simulation in itself is a civil concept, not an offence. It becomes criminally relevant through the use made of it: if the simulated contract is documented with falsehoods and produced as evidence, it may amount to falsehood; if it is put to the judge to mislead them, procedural fraud; and if it serves to remove assets to the detriment of the other spouse, fraudulent removal of assets. The line lies in the instrumentalisation of the simulation.
What is procedural fraud in a divorce?
Procedural fraud (article 453 of the Criminal Code) carries six to twelve years’ imprisonment for anyone who, by any fraudulent means, misleads a public servant —here, the family judge— in order to obtain a judgment or decision contrary to law. In a divorce it can arise through doctored inventories, concealment of income, false documents or coached witnesses, provided the means used is genuinely capable of misleading the judge.
My spouse reported me to the police on false facts to pressure me. What can I do?
The instrumentalised complaint has an answer within criminal law itself. Accusing a person under oath of conduct they did not commit can amount to false accusation against an identified person (article 436 of the Criminal Code), carrying sixty-four to one hundred and forty-four months’ imprisonment. The victim of a fabricated complaint can bring their own action; the falsehood should be documented and acted on with criminal-law advice.
Do I always need a criminal lawyer as well as a family lawyer?
No. Most divorces are resolved in the family courts alone. Dual representation makes sense where signs of this conduct appear —concealment of assets, false documents or fabricated complaints—: the divorce then becomes two interlocking proceedings with different standards, the evidence of fraud serves both in the division and in the criminal case, and decisions in one bear on the other. Representation integrating family and criminal law then allows the coherence of both fronts to be protected, the criminal route to redress to be opened, and the strategy itself to be kept from drifting into offences such as false accusation.
Can I recover financially what my spouse diverted?
There are two complementary routes. In the family proceeding, reconstruction of the marital estate and compensating entries allow what was improperly diverted to be brought back into the division. In the criminal proceeding, once responsibility is established, the full-redress proceeding (articles 102 to 108 of Ley 906 de 2004) allows compensation to be claimed, with the caveat that it lapses thirty days after the conviction becomes final. The right strategy defines which route and at what moment.
Legal and bibliographic references
Colombia. Ley 599 de 2000, Código Penal. Artículos 253 y 454 (alzamiento de bienes y fraude a resolución judicial); 286 a 291 (falsedades documentales); 453 (fraude procesal); 435, 436 y 442 (falsa denuncia, falsa denuncia contra persona determinada y falso testimonio).
Colombia. Ley 906 de 2004, Código de Procedimiento Penal. Artículos 102 a 108 (incidente de reparación integral).
Colombia. Ley 2477 de 2025. Artículo 78A del Código de Procedimiento Penal (extinción de la acción penal por reparación integral). Diario Oficial 53.178 del 11 de julio de 2025.
Colombia. Ley 1257 de 2008. Artículo 3, literal d (definición de daño patrimonial contra la mujer).
Note: This content is informative and does not constitute legal advice on a particular case. The characterisation of each act depends on the particular circumstances and on the evidence.
About the author
Juan Antonio Matiz Monroy — A graduate of the Universidad de los Andes (2017) with a specialisation in Criminal Law from the Universidad Sergio Arboleda (2021), he built a solid command of oral litigation at the Universidad del Rosario and at the Universidad de Salamanca, Spain. He sharpened his rigour in evidential reasoning with CESJUL and the Universidad Externado de Colombia. In parallel he went deeper into asset forfeiture —a field that requires understanding the State’s logic on property with the same rigour with which liberty is defended—. He is currently a candidate for the Master’s in Evidential Reasoning at the Universitat de Girona (Spain) and the Università degli Studi di Genova (Italy). Professional licence 294.746 (C.S.J.).