Juan Antonio Matiz Monroy — Lawyer, Universidad de los Andes · Specialist in Criminal Law, Universidad Sergio Arboleda · Professional licence 294.746 (C.S.J.)
You published —or are thinking of publishing— an account of gender-based violence on social media, and the question is one: can they take legal action against you for that?
The Prosecution Service issued Directive 001 of 27 March 2026 and with it set a position. Someone who was a victim can go to the courts and can also tell publicly what happened to them.
But that protection has a scope, and it is not unlimited. Stepping outside it —by subject, by form or by content— has consequences the Directive does not remove.
The short answer is that yes, they can, if the publication falls outside the scope the Directive covers. The rest depends on three things worth knowing beforehand: the Directive’s reach, the content it requires and its real effects.
Before going into detail, three ideas order what follows:
- Public denunciation (escrache). It is the public accusation, individual or collective, made on social media or in the press, to make acts of gender-based violence visible.
- Directive. It is an internal guideline the Attorney General issues to prosecutors; it steers how they investigate, but it repeals no offence in the Criminal Code.
- Insult and calumny. These are the two offences against moral integrity. Calumny requires that the imputation of an offence be false; insult, that the imputation be dishonouring, without requiring falsity.
That is what this piece is about: the reach, content and effects of the Directive for the person who publishes. It is not a manual on victims’ rights or on how a querella is processed.
1. Public denunciation online in Colombia: the denunciation the Directive protects —and the one it does not
The Directive starts from a definition. It calls escrache the individual or collective statement in which —especially women— publicly denounce acts of gender-based or sexual violence.
That is violence suffered by reason of the gender of the person who suffers it, and it can be told in the street, on social media or in the press. The Directive treats it as a legitimate exercise of freedom of expression, for its public interest and for its function of making structural violence visible.
That characterisation was not invented by the Prosecution Service: it is taken from the Constitutional Court. The Court explains that in Latin America escrache «is used in the face of the inaction of other institutions» (C. Const., Sent. T-356, oct. 15/2021. M.P. José Fernando Reyes Cuartas).
And that society and the State are called to protect those who use social media as a «release valve», where judicial or administrative means «are not sufficient, suitable, quick or safe» (C. Const., Sent. T-275, ago. 18/2021. M.P. Paola Andrea Meneses Mosquera). No one is required to wait for a judgment to say what happened to them.
Two things are worth making clear. Public denunciation is not a criminal complaint: whoever publishes does not set proceedings in motion or become a party to them. And the protection is presumed, but does not cover any accusation or any way of making it.
The Directive moves within that framework and does not widen it. It is a guideline the Attorney General addresses to prosecutors: it tells them how to investigate, but it does not reform the Criminal Code or bind judges. That is why whatever falls outside what it covers is still judged by the ordinary rules.
2. Stepping outside the scope has consequences
The Directive covers precise ground: publicly denouncing gender-based violence that was suffered or is known about. We call that ground the scope. Outside it, publishing is judged by the ordinary rules, and the answer to the opening question is that yes, they can take action against you.
There are three ways of stepping outside that ground. By the subject denounced, by the form of publication and by the content of what is asserted. Any of the three leaves the publication outside what the Directive protects.
The subject comes first. The Directive applies to acts of gender-based violence known or denounced through escrache, and to nothing else: violence that causes harm «by reason of her condition as a woman», in public or in private (L. 1257/2008, art. 2).
A personal, commercial or employment dispute with nothing to do with that violence does not come in that way, however serious. Such an accusation is judged like any other.
Form comes second, and there is a Constitutional Court case that shows it well. A man was publicly accused, on Facebook and Instagram, of having raped a minor; alongside the accusation his identity card number, his home address and photographs of him were published.
He brought a constitutional injunction. The Court did not protect his honour, his reputation or his presumption of innocence: the accusation stood.
It did protect his privacy and his image, and ordered those details removed, because threats had forced him to move house (C. Const., Sent. T-275, ago. 18/2021, cit.). The accusation travelled with the protection; the extra detail did not.
The Directive rests on that same judgment, but only on part of it. It takes up its limits of honour, reputation and presumption of innocence, and says not a word about the personal data of the person named. That limit does not come from the Directive but from the Constitution.
Content comes third, and here who publishes matters. When the victim speaks of what happened to her, the principles of truthfulness and impartiality «must be understood as relaxed in respect of someone communicating their own experience» (C. Const., Sent. T-289, ago. 27/2021. M.P. Alberto Rojas Ríos).
They are required of someone who did not live through the events. Telling as one’s own what one did not live through, or treating hearsay as established, leaves the publication without the backing that protects it.
Relaxing is not exempting. The same judgment warns that anyone who commits «falsehoods or inaccuracies» will be subject «to the criminal sanctions and civil reparations that apply».
On the other side, proof of truth is not closed off. It lies against accusations of sexual violence where they have «public interest» and have «the victim’s consent» (C. Const., Sent. C-222, jun. 23/2022. M.P. Cristina Pardo Schlesinger).
What can arrive, then? First, a criminal complaint for one of the three offences the Directive did not touch: insult, if what was said dishonours someone; calumny, if an offence they did not commit was attributed to them; and false accusation against an identified person, if that attribution was taken to the authorities (C.P., art. 436).
Second, a constitutional injunction or a civil claim before a judge and, where the parties are or were family, a protective measure before a family commission. The Directive stops none of these, because it does not speak to those authorities.
That last route has been used and the Court has corrected it. In 2026 it annulled a detention sanction imposed by a family commission on a woman whose publications were escrache (C. Const., Sent. T-091, abr. 20/2026. M.P. Jorge Enrique Ibáñez Najar).
And the Directive does not bind the prosecutor either. It is still the prosecutor who decides whether the case is closed or moves towards a trial, so invoking it as though it settled the matter gets nowhere.
That is why the opening question is not answered with a yes or a no in the abstract. It is answered by looking at one thing: whether the publication stayed on the ground the Directive covers or stepped outside it.
3. What to know: reach, content and effects
Three things are enough to decide with judgement before publishing: what reach the Directive has, what content it requires of whoever denounces and what effects it really produces. None of them requires being a lawyer.
The reach is whom the Directive binds and what subjects it covers. It binds prosecutors, not judges: it tells them how to investigate, without changing any law. It covers acts of gender-based violence known or denounced through escrache, and leaves untouched the constitutional injunction and the civil route, which follow their own path before a judge.
The content is what the Directive requires of whoever publishes. It recognises escrache as a legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and, in the same movement, warns that publishing can affect «the honour, reputation and presumption of innocence» of the person named.
Hence the right to publish «must be exercised with particular care and responsibility, so as to publish only truthful and impartial assertions, respecting the presumption of innocence until a conviction is handed down» (num. 7).
And the Directive makes clear that a gender perspective «does not mean the facts denounced are presumed true» and does not relieve the Prosecution Service of corroborating them (num. 8). Neither does escrache by itself prove what it asserts, nor may the prosecutor take it as proved.
The effects are what really changes. The Directive repealed no offence and modified no procedure: it changed what the prosecutor has to look at when the person named responds with a complaint for insult or calumny.
They must first check whether an investigation is already open into the facts denounced in the escrache and, if not, «shall continue the investigation into both forms of conduct and analyse them in context» (num. 7).
It also requires insult and calumny to be assessed with a gender perspective, so that they do not produce a «silencing» effect, and to «avoid presuming an intent to harm» in someone who was defending themselves. The declared purpose is to prevent the investigation being «instrumentalised as a mechanism of reprisal against those who denounce» (nums. 6 and 7).
| What the Directive does add | What the Directive does not change |
|---|---|
| Activating the investigation of the aggression when the insult complaint reveals it | The force of insult, calumny and false accusation |
| Not presuming an intent to harm in someone who was defending themselves | The scope: only gender-based violence, not any online dispute |
| Corroborating: a gender perspective does not presume truth | The injunction and civil routes, which it does not govern |
That is what to know before publishing. It makes no ground safe, but it allows the publication the law protects to be told apart from the one that opens proceedings.
4. Conclusions
Yes, they can take action against you for a public denunciation, and Directive 001 of 2026 does not prevent it. The Directive guides prosecutors, but it repeals neither insult, calumny nor false accusation. Nor does it govern the constitutional injunction or the civil route. The protection the Constitutional Court recognises has a scope: publicly denouncing gender-based violence. One steps outside it by subject, by form or by content.
A dispute unrelated to that violence does not fall within the scope. Publishing the identity card number or home address of the person named can infringe their privacy, even if the accusation stands. Someone who did not live through the events, moreover, is held to truthfulness and impartiality. What the Directive does change is the prosecutor’s view: analysing both forms of conduct in context and not presuming an intent to harm.
Knowing the Directive’s reach, content and effects before publishing is the purpose of the initial consultation. In it we review what you plan to publish, or have already published, against those three criteria. From that diagnosis, the firm can take on victim representation for the violence denounced. It can also take on the criminal defence against a complaint for insult or calumny.
Frequently asked questions
What people usually ask us
Is public denunciation online lawful in Colombia?
The Constitutional Court treats it as a prima facie legitimate exercise of freedom of expression, with reinforced protection. It substitutes for access to institutional mechanisms that are not always sufficient, suitable, quick or safe. That protection is presumed, but it reaches truthful denunciation: the Directive itself requires truthful and impartial assertions. Sections 1 and 3 develop this.
Does the Directive protect me from a complaint for insult or calumny?
It does not close the matter for whoever complains of insult. If there are indications that behind the accusation there was gender-based violence, that same complaint opens the investigation of the underlying act: the prosecutor continues on both counts and analyses them in context. Insult, calumny and false accusation remain in force, and the constitutional injunction and the civil route are decided by a judge, outside the Directive. Sections 2 and 3 develop this.
What if I am pressured for having denounced?
The response often arrives as pressure: several proceedings at once, disproportionate financial claims or exposure of the work and family setting. The Constitutional Court calls it judicial harassment to go to the courts in order to silence expression on a matter of public interest. Against that pressure, the constitutional injunction allows protection to be sought for the privacy, personal safety and freedom of expression of the person who denounced. And no formal complaint is needed for the prosecutor to act: public denunciation is a source of knowledge and article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code already required investigation of facts arriving by any other means.
Does the Directive apply if the person named prosecutes without the Prosecution Service?
In these offences the law allows the offended party to take the prosecution into their own hands and run it without the Prosecution Service. When that happens the prosecutor leaves the case, and with them guidelines addressed to an official who is no longer there. The Directive does not then govern the proceeding, although the limits in section 2 remain the same.
Legal and bibliographic references
Administrative act. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Directiva 001 del 27 de marzo de 2026, por la cual se establecen lineamientos para el abordaje de hechos de violencia basada en género conocidos o denunciados mediante escrache. This article sets out its paragraphs 1, 3 and 6 to 8, of the seventeen it contains. See the official document (scanned) or its transcription in the Régimen Legal de Bogotá.
Note. The review of social media by the Criminal Analysis Sections and the address denuncia.acoso@fiscalia.gov.co are internal organisational measures, not dealt with here.
Legislation. C.N., arts. 15, 21, 228 y 251. · C.P., arts. 220, 221, 224 —num. 2 exequible condicionado por la Sent. C-222/22— y 436 (L. 599/2000). · CPP, arts. 7.º, 66, 74, 133, 205 y 534 (L. 906/2004, mod. L. 1826/2017). · L. 1257/2008, arts. 1.º a 3.º · L. 248/1995, aprobatoria de la Convención de Belém do Pará, art. 1.º
Case law. C. Const., Sent. T-275, ago. 18/2021. M.P. Paola Andrea Meneses Mosquera. · C. Const., Sent. T-356, oct. 15/2021. M.P. José Fernando Reyes Cuartas. · C. Const., Sent. T-452, dic. 12/2022. M.P. Diana Fajardo Rivera. · C. Const., Sent. SU-420, sep. 12/2019. M.P. José Fernando Reyes Cuartas. · C. Const., Sent. T-289, ago. 27/2021. M.P. Alberto Rojas Ríos. · C. Const., Sent. T-061, feb. 23/2022. M.P. Alberto Rojas Ríos. · C. Const., Sent. C-222, jun. 23/2022. M.P. Cristina Pardo Schlesinger. · C. Const., Sent. T-241, jul. 6/2023. M.P. Natalia Ángel Cabo. · C. Const., Sent. C-487, nov. 15/2023. M.P. Jorge Enrique Ibáñez Najar. · C. Const., Sent. T-044, mar. 6/2026. M.P. Vladimir Fernández Andrade. · C. Const., Sent. T-091, abr. 20/2026. M.P. Jorge Enrique Ibáñez Najar.
Scholarship. Botero Marino, Catalina; Guzmán Duque, Federico; Jaramillo Otoya, Sofía y Gómez Upegui, Salomé. El derecho a la libertad de expresión. Curso avanzado para jueces y operadores jurídicos en las Américas. Bogotá: Dejusticia, 2017. · Córdoba Angulo, Miguel. «Delitos contra la integridad moral». En Lecciones de derecho penal. Parte especial, t. I, 2.ª ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2011. · Laurenzo Copello, Patricia. Los delitos contra el honor. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2002. · Aguirre Román, Javier Orlando. «Reconstrucción del derecho a la libertad de expresión en la jurisprudencia constitucional». Opinión Jurídica, núm. 12 (2007): 35-59. · Henao Guerrero, Dalila Andrea. «Garantismo penal en tiempos de escrache». Ámbito Jurídico, 8 de julio de 2025.
Inter-American sources. Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Relatoría Especial para la Libertad de Expresión. Marco jurídico interamericano sobre el derecho a la libertad de expresión. Actualización 2025. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, CIDH/RELE/INF.29/25. · Libertad de expresión e Internet. OEA/Ser.L/V/II, CIDH/RELE/INF.11/13, 31 de diciembre de 2013.
About the author
Juan Antonio Matiz Monroy — A graduate of the Universidad de los Andes (2017) with a specialisation in Criminal Law from the Universidad Sergio Arboleda (2021), he built a solid command of oral litigation at the Universidad del Rosario and at the Universidad de Salamanca, Spain. He sharpened his rigour in evidential reasoning with CESJUL and the Universidad Externado de Colombia. In parallel he went deeper into asset forfeiture —a field that requires understanding the State’s logic on property with the same rigour with which liberty is defended—. He is currently a candidate for the Master’s in Evidential Reasoning at the Universitat de Girona (Spain) and the Università degli Studi di Genova (Italy). Professional licence 294.746 (C.S.J.).